PSA: Demand Board Transparency, Vote No on Material DAO Proposals Until Significant Governance Issues Addressed

TL/DR

  • Alarming track record uncovered with respect to anon TrueFi Board Member Ferengi
  • Demand greater transparency of Ferengi and his “grand CDP vision”
  • Limit any material long-term changes before independent board members are elected

Dear TrueFi Community,

We hereby notify the community of a second ongoing governance attack and our investigation has unfortunately led us to uncover suspected bad actors and a mosaic of questionable activity related to collateralized debt protocol architecture (”CDP”) exit scams and pump and dumps.

We ask for greater transparency into the two-person Board of Directors’ plan to form a budget— before they have articulated a plan and before they’ve brought on additional outside directors.

Moreover, do we want a board member who has (1) a history of close association with exit scams and pump and dumps, (2) clear association and support of known scammers, and (3) a dismally poor investment track record to be in charge of the new “Vision” for TrueFi? Do you want this supposed “Vision” to be hidden behind closed doors?

If the answers to the above questions are yes, then Cicada Partners has no interest to remain as part of TrueFi.

With that said, we feel it is our obligation to share the following findings:


Ferengi: Supporter of Known Scammers and DAO Capital Destroyer

Ferengi’s history of partnerships reads like a “who’s who” of crypto’s most notorious scammers. His close associations with Sifu, aka Michael Patryn—the convicted fraudster behind QuadrigaCX—are deeply troubling. Patryn is well known in DeFi for resurfacing under the pseudonym “Sifu” and wreaking havoc with Sifu Vision, a project Ferengi has wholeheartedly endorsed. These connections warrant careful scrutiny, especially when considering governance and the allocation of community resources.

Below you will see The_Ferengi’s open support of known scammer 0xSifu in the Wonderland Forums:

Another clear alliance is with Masa, aka TheSkyHopper, a founder of Bastion Trading, who resigned as TrueFi’s board amid a scandal over undisclosed conflicts of interest whereby Masa, as a Board Director, attempted to overstep the governance process and force through an unpopular proposal that was a disguised acquisition of an index product that TrueFi already had built.

We have on first-hand account that Masa recommended Ferengi to the board and are deeply intertwined, with the former’s connections to Teragon.io, linking all parties to Volta Club (more on this below).

Masa’s resignation from TrueFi came after accusations of governance attacks, yet Ferengi still operates as a one of a two-person Board of Directors, which is proposing to quickly centralize resources to the Teragon team before the DAO elects additional board members.

History of Pump and Dumps

SIFU was merely the first in a long line of questionable public recommendations from Ferengi. Most recently came ENQAI, a supposed “decentralized AI” project that sought to capitalize on the AI craze gripping the market in late 2023.
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An anonymous team of developers, no transparent spending or fund raising, and the telltale signs of a pump-and-dump scheme. ENQAI was hyped, pumped to unsustainable heights, and—like clockwork—dumped just as fast. Six months after its peak, outsiders were clearly left holding the bag.

After very preliminary research, a similar pattern has emerged: Ferengi would endorse a project, publicly support before the inevitable crash. This could be due to poor judgment on his part, or something more concerning. His involvement in Interport, which raised millions in a private round before plummeting to a $10 million market cap, follows this same blueprint. At this time we struggle to find evidence of bad insiders there, just questionable actions in capital markets.

Volta Club

But perhaps the very worst indictment on Ferengi’s capacity to hold a Directorship and tendency to sponsor questionable activity is Volta Club. Volta Club is little more than a rebranded scam, born out of the ashes of Wonderland, which promised investors staggering returns of up to 80,000% APY before crumbling. Wonderland was nothing more than a fork of the ill-fated Ohm protocol, itself known for its rapid rise and even faster fall. Wonderland collapsed, and Volta Club is now following in its footsteps, only in a highly illiquid, but slow death spiral.

Below is a quick summary of The_Ferengi’s PUBLIC investment recommendations to the project:

Ferengi, as Treasury Manager, proposed to increase Volta Club’s allocation to UwU, a fork of Aave by an anonymous team. Conveniently, before UwU was “hacked” in what many experts suspect was an inside job, Ferengi increased Volta’s exposure further to 20%. The protocol was “audited,” but the oracle was somehow left out of scope from the audit and ultimately became the hacker’s entry point. Ferengi’s backing of UwU, just like SIFU and others, left Volta holding a worthless asset that they could pass to the blame of “hackers”. CDP-based exit scam.

A proven track record is critical when evaluating the suitability of board members and service providers. It serves as a key indicator of trustworthiness, reliability, and the ability to act in the best interest of the community. Any history of questionable practices or lack of transparency should raise immediate red flags, particularly when significant responsibilities and large budgets are at stake. Ensuring that those in leadership positions have demonstrated integrity and sound decision-making is essential for the long-term success of any project or protocol. Ferengi’s track record in his previous treasury management positions and his public recommendation of $SIFU and UwU raise the question of his suitability to continue to serve the TrueFi board in the capacity of Director.

If Ferengi’s “treasury experience” has emerged from the shadows of Wonderland, with his now-infamous recommendation of $SIFU and UwU, we can’t see how any crypto protocol or future board member would want to be associated with this actor’s “Vision” and give him access to a seven-figure budget from the DAO.

Today, Volta Club and Sifu Vision’s so-called investments have became dangerously illiquid, with the projects pivoting to obscure early-stage assets, with limited public DAO details, and sharing information on a privately managed spreadsheet. Their unverified balance sheet shows a dramatic collapse from $150 million to a mere $33 million through the recent bull market, most of it seemingly trapped in the sinking opaque ship that is $SIFU.

Final Words

It’s truly unfortunate to see these kinds of allegations being made within such an avant-garde crypto lending primitive. Let it be known that Cicada Partners take these allegations very seriously. We firmly believe that integrity and reputation shall never be compromised for the sake of short term financial gain. We ask that, at a minimum, the community ask Ferengi to doxx his identity and explain the mosaic of questionable activities.

Best regards and be safe,

Cicada Partners

I mean, this is all very easily refutable low effort FUD.

Michael quit Quadriga three years before the founder rugged and was cleared by the official investigation done by Canadian authorities.

EnqAI (while noiseGPT pre-rebrand) was actually a fair launch token. If I remember correctly they messed up the LP on launch and supply was sniped. Product is real, working and I am very much active in the efforts of driving value to the ecosystem as they are building an L3. API should be releasing within a month or so too. One of few AI-protocols that isnt a GPT-wrapper but an actual LLM, but once again, Cicada doesnt do their research.

I also have not worked for Wonderland for over a year.
SV is 90% liquid by the way: ETH, BTC and stables. All on chain.
Volta is like 95% SV. Which is liquid.

Regarding the increase in UwU exposure to 20% – we were not purchasing the tokens on the market, we were farming them (its a lending protocol fyi, which you probably dont know since your research is so poorly done).

The thing is, we have this thing called governance which means we need to get approval to up certain exposures to meet the risk parameters set by the DAO holders.
I guess adhering to governance is a bad thing in your book.

The exploit which involved manipulating the price of an sUSDe oracle happened a year after I left Wonderland. It was not on my watch, nor was it at the protocol where I worked. Since Cicada is so grossly misinformed, let me remind them that sUSDe did not even exist during my tenure.

Like, if you wanna try to dig up dirt you will have to do a lot better, because this is just adorable.

By the way, you know that I am doxxed to Walkers, the TrueFi Foundation and DWF right?

I am literally the guy who negotiate my own salary down because I dont want to extract value.

Kind regards,
Ferengi

While its agreed that It’s crucial that we thoroughly address any issues to maintain the integrity of our governance and treasury.

However, based on the claims presented, I haven’t seen clear evidence of wrongdoing by the board member in question. Just because they had “close association” to someone on the same project who might have been shady doesn’t mean they’re guilty of “scamming.”

If we’re going to make serious accusations, the DAO would need solid evidence or statements from individuals who have actually been affected or scammed. Without that, it’s hard to take these claims seriously wouldn’t you agree?

Regarding yor “governance attack” claims

Calling this situation a “governance attack” is not only misleading but, in my opinion, a blatant attempt to undermine the intelligence of the DAO. If you’re going to make such a serious accusation that this proposal is a governance attack, you need to actually understand what you’re talking about.

A genuine governance attack involves manipulating or exploiting a decentralised system’s voting or decision-making processes, like through malicious proposals or flash loan exploits.
But let’s be clear please: [TFIP-19] TrueFi Forward Vision and Operational Expense Request is not malicious proposal in any way. It may lack clarity from some DAO members’ perspectives, and they may not like, or disagree with its direction. But to label it as a governance attack is not just unfair—it’s an insult to the other board member, suggesting that they might be complicit or foolish enough to allow such an attack on governance. That’s both uncalled for and unethical.

If you’re genuinely concerned, invest more in $TRU and stake to increase your voting power, allowing you to have a say in the proper voting process. If you have an issue with the proposal, it would be far more constructive to engage as a voting DAO member rather than making unfounded claims of a “governance attack.”

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First, I think its a shame to simply implicate an individual with actions of a organization larger than him or herself, but to assess the individual on their sole merits.

By using the same metric that you applied to Ferengi - I should call on you, Cicada to resign based on your affiliation with Orthogonal Trading, a group that were you part of, based on the serious misrepresentation made by the firm to Maple regarding loans made in a LP pool.

I’d argue that the reputational fallout by simple affiliation to this can cause quite a bit of headwinds for the Truefi ecosystem with Cicada’s involvement. However, that wouldn’t be fair, would it?

But lets go a little further back in 2022: when it comes to managing a pool, maybe we should go examine 10 million dollar wipeout from Babel that you, as Orthogonal Credit, had extended, and the borrower defaulted on?

Lets go over some history here on how you treated some 220 million dollars of lenders in your pool then? Maybe I’ll get some dates to jog your memory here?

Lets start with June 17th 2022:

And with official debt standstill announcement on June 21st, 2022

https://www.reuters.com/technology/crypto-lender-babel-finance-wins-debt-repayment-reprieve-after-withdrawal-freeze-2022-06-20/

The right decision (and not even in hindsight) at that time would be to mark down the pool for the potential loss, slash the MAPL pool with Orthogonal’s risk capital, and look for recovery for the pool equitably.

More importantly, there would be that 29 million dollars out of around 250 million of debt would be maturing from 2 trading frims returning funds between June 21st and June 30th, and with withdrawal requests coming from amounts I believe even larger than that amount.

Sadly, nothing was done about marking down the portfolio until July 1st, after these two large repayments constituting more than 10% of the LP pool was repaid.

Is it fair or ethical to let those out early without the capital losses from this default? I’m sure theres the last 230 million US Dollars of lenders asking the same thing – lenders from a rather good diverse set of backgrounds too.

The thing is – provisioning for losses isn’t a new idea or concept, and with live redemptions coming, should have been a serious consideration let alone the right application. Personally, I think its downright unethical to do otherwise.

On entrusting the Treasury to the Board:
The board is looking to expand to more directors (and thus multi-sig holders I envision) that the treasury by no means is controlled by a single individual. I interpet an attack on a single member of the board , and also to be unprovoked, to be an attack on the governance itself in fact.

On Claims of People being Scammers:
Furthermore, to accuse someone of being a scammer (in this case, 0xSifu and Ferengi) is nearly libelous – as there are no arrests etc or evidence of proof. I will not waste any time on elaborating on this even though I can at at later point.

On Doxxing:
I think that it goes against the ethos of crypto to call for doxxing of persons for a multitude of reasons: the main one I’d point to is personal security with assets controlled by cold wallet applications on immutable blockchains. Remember that Truefi is a DAO, and directors were duly voted in, with conditions of anonymity or not.

Lastly, lets review this:
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The reality is that there’s no indication that the community (besides yourselves) who wish to see that Ferengi leave the board. Thus, I’d suggest that you exercise your interest to remain at part of Truefi and exit.

Firstly, lets define the word Attack in a way thats relevant.

"The word attack refers to an aggressive action aimed at causing harm or damage to someone or something. It can also mean a verbal or written criticism intended to discredit or undermine someone or an idea. In broader contexts, such as cybersecurity or strategy, an attack is any deliberate effort to breach defenses, systems, or protocols to achieve a harmful objective"

Now lets discuss, Reverse Governance Attacks

I’m not suggesting that this post is involved in any such activities, but I’m sharing this information to help educate other DAO members on what a Reverse Governance Attack might look like.

A reverse governance attack reverse governance attack refers to a situation in a decentralised autonomous organisation (DAO) where the governance process is manipulated or exploited to harm the protocol or its community. Whether intentional or not, these actions focus on undermining the governance process or steering sentiment in a way that weakens the DAO’s governance from within.

In some cases, attackers may simply disagree with the DAO’s governance decisions or strategic direction. Their actions are aimed at influencing the governance process to reflect their personal or ideological views, rather than the collective interests of the DAO.

In a typical Governance Attack, bad actors acquire a majority of governance tokens or voting power to make malicious proposals or pass harmful votes.

In contrast, a Reverse Governance Attack involves more subtle strategies, such as:

  1. Influencing Key Proposals: In a reverse governance attack, malicious actors may introduce or heavily support governance proposals that seem to align with the DAO’s interests but are actually crafted to serve their own hidden agenda long term. These proposals are designed to subtly divert resources away from the DAO and its Treasury, redirecting funds to support their own projects or services. Over time, this approach weakens the governance structure and drains the protocol’s resources, ultimately leaving the organisation vulnerable and destabilised.

  2. Manipulating Voting Power: By fostering disputes or disagreements among community members, attackers can create factions within the DAO. These factions may have conflicting interests, making it harder to achieve unified decisions and slowing down the governance process. This fragmentation can lead to inefficiencies and conflicts that undermine the DAO’s ability to function effectively.

  3. Discrediting or Disempowering Key Members: Attackers may focus on influential or respected members within the DAO who play a significant role in the decision-making process. By discrediting or marginalising these key figures, attackers create division and confusion.

Here is a prime example RESCINDED [Board Candidate] Tom Lombardi’s Platform Statement

This fragmentation can prevent the community from reaching consensus on important matters, weakening the overall governance structure.

  1. Deliberate Miscommunication: Attackers may disseminate false or misleading information to confuse voters and influence their decisions. This can lead to votes being cast based on inaccurate or biased information, affecting the outcome of governance decisions and ultimately harming the DAO

The end goal of a reverse governance attack is not immediate control but rather the gradual weakening or destabilisation of the project, making it more susceptible to further attacks or manipulation.

Regardless of the underlying motives of those trying to undermine the DAO’s governance structure, their actions clearly do not prioritise the protocol’s best interests. Instead, they are focused on advancing their own agendas, often without concern for the potential harm they cause.

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I lost 250k to you morons…. Fuck you all.

I’m sorry to hear about the potential $250k loss. It can feel overwhelming, but it’s important to remember that until those losses are realised (by selling), they’re not permanent.

Some comfort :raised_hands:

The crypto and DeFi markets are incredibly volatile right now, and the entire industry is still in a building phase, meaning there’s room for recovery and growth as it matures.

Right now, the market as a whole is down—regardless of what you bought into—so this dip is affecting everyone.(including myself and many others) A longer-term investment strategy can often help navigate these rough patches and potentially regain value as the market stabilises.

Good things to come for TrueFi :zap: Hang in there and stay positive :pray:

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Dear strategi,

You are a very patient man. I hope this will work out for you. I sold my truefi and i am out. Truefi was once a great project but it is simply a scam right now. I didn’t do my due diligence and I deserve the catastrophic losses. Stay safe.

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